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LET'S CALL THE WHOLE THING OFF? 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE 
OVER ORIGINAUSM. By Dennis J. Goldford.1 Cambridge 
University Press, New York. 2005. Pp. xi, 305. $75.00 (hard); 
$29.99 (paper). 
Keith E. Whittington2 
"The only jurisprudence that has made it into the public 
sphere is ... originalism."3 Since the 1980s, conservative Presi-
dents and legal intellectuals have very visibly insisted on original 
meaning as the touchstone of constitutional interpretation. Law-
yers in and around the Reagan Administration settled on 
originalism as the essential core within the general conservative 
rhetoric lambasting "judicial activism" and exhorting "strict con-
structionism" and then helped shape this general disposition into 
a relatively concrete theory of constitutional interpretation and 
judicial review. The conservative commitment to originalism at 
least kept it on the political agenda and impressed it into the 
public consciousness. Originalism fared less well in the scholarly 
debates over constitutional theory in the 1980s, but it remains 
one of the contenders as a large-scale theory of constitutional in-
terpretation, and there is little question that historical inquiry 
into original meaning remains a standard (if not decisive) mode 
of constitutional argumentation. 
It is perhaps a propitious time to return to the originalism 
debates. The administration of President George W. Bush has 
not mounted the same sort of public campaign for originalism 
that the Meese Justice Department did, but that is in part be-
cause two decades after the founding of the Federalist Society 
and the ill-fated nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme 
Court, the Bush administration can take originalism for granted 
I. Associate Professor of Politics, Drake University. 
2. Visiting Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin, and Professor of Poli-
tics, Princeton University. 
3. Clyde Spillenger, quoted in Jess Bravin, Change on the Supreme Court, WALL 
ST. J., July 5, 2005, at A4. 
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as part of its intellectual and political background. Confirmation 
fights over conservative judicial appointments and continuing 
controversy over the Supreme Court's constitutional jurispru-
dence give originalism renewed prominence. Although for many 
the originalism debates remain forever frozen in 1987, a "new 
originalism" has been developing within the scholarship for 
many years now and the dance of originalist proponents and crit-
ics requires some new moves.4 
Dennis Goldford's new book revisits the originalism debate 
with a goal of getting past it. What is interesting about original-
ism for him is precisely how it illuminates general problems of 
American constitutional theory. With a clear-eyed picture of the 
Constitution, he argues, we can get beyond originalism and non-
originalism and develop a constitutional theory that transcends 
that old division. Goldford's proposed alternative, what he calls 
"a theory of constitutional textuality," shares a great deal with 
recent constitutional theorizing and is often quite illuminating, 
of both the Constitution and constitutional theory (p. 10). 
Somewhat surprisingly, I found myself largely in agreement with 
the book, despite its being pitched primarily as a critique of 
originalism. Perhaps this suggests that Goldford has transcended 
the originalism debate after all, though I do not think so. There 
is a great deal of theoretical common ground to be found out 
there, but there are still important points of disagreement. It is 
worth locating both. In order to do so, Part I of this review 
summarizes Goldford's argument, Part II raises a problem of 
constitutional authority that is not adequately answered in this 
theory of constitutional textuality, and Part III sketches an ap-
proach that situates originalism within American constitutional-
ism, accommodating if not transcending originalism and 
nonoriginalism. 
I. GOLDFORD'S CRITIQUE OF ORIGINALISM AND 
THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL TEXTUALITY 
Much of the book is framed as a review of the originalism 
debate and as a critique of originalism. For those looking for an 
accessible introduction to that literature, Goldford is a reliable 
and fair guide. While he provides critical commentary on the ar-
guments that have been made by others (almost always siding 
4. See Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599 
(2004). 
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with the critics of originalism), this discussion does not signifi-
cantly redefine the terms of the debate or significantly advance 
its margins. 
Goldford first introduces the "debate over originalism" as 
the indirect exchange between Attorney General Edwin Meese 
and Associate Justice William Brennan in 1985. While Meese 
and allies such as Robert Bork accused those who would aban-
don the original meaning of the Constitution when engaging in 
judicial review as engaging in naked politics, Brennan charged 
that the originalists merely chose to disguise their politics. Gold-
ford takes this charge quite seriously, and thus spends some time 
attempting to identify "at least one instance in which originalists 
acknowledge that a liberal result is generated by originalist in-
terpretation," and thereby saving "originalism from originalists 
themselves" (pp. 37, 38). He finds such a savior in Justice Hugo 
Black, whose argument about the historical meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause proved able to 
"yield liberal as well as conservative results" (p. 50). With the 
example of Black before us, we are apparently in a position to 
take originalism seriously as a theory of constitutional interpre-
tation, partly freed from the taint of its association with conser-
vative advocates. 
With those preliminaries out of the way, Goldford divides 
the debate over originalism into several distinct arguments. In 
each, originalists and their critics are shown to embrace a series 
of sharp dichotomies. Those dichotomies are then subverted to 
show that each side has only a partial grip on the proper under-
standing of American constitutionalism. Whether in the context 
of disagreements over a living constitution versus a fixed consti-
tution, interpretation versus noninterpretation, objectivity versus 
subjectivity, originalists are understood to be driven by the fear 
of unconstrained judges exercising discretion to make policy 
from the bench, and consequently the need for a set of fetters by 
which judges can be tied down. Goldford ranges widely in pre-
senting these debates. He does not limit himself to the most 
prominent public or scholarly defenders of originalists but freely 
pulls in historical judges and politicians, relatively obscure law 
review articles, and those who might not be thought of as 
originalists at all, such as Harry Jaffa. The criticisms of original-
ism are generally drawn from the expected sources. 
For those seeking an overview of the ins and outs of the de-
bate over originalism in the 1980s, the first several chapters of 
The American Constitution and the Debate over Originalism are 
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a convenient source. The coverage can be somewhat idiosyn-
cratic, however, and the focus is on the big dividing lines be-
tween originalists and their opponents rather than on the con-
tours or development of originalism itself. Gregory Bassham's 
Original Intent and the Constitution remains the essential source 
for a comprehensive and analytically sharp overview of the 
originalist theories of the 1980s.5 Johnathan O'Neill has now 
done for originalism what Laura Kalman did for "legal liberal-
ism, "6 providing a serious intellectual history of originalism from 
the postwar period to the present.7 
The summary and critique of originalism is ultimately a sec-
ondary aim of the book, however. The primary purpose of the 
extended journey through the originalism debates is to lay bare 
some basic issues in American constitutionalism and to set up 
Goldford's own response to those issues. This is a somewhat in-
direct path to the desired endpoint, encouraging some repetition 
in the presentation (key arguments are repeated nearly verbatim 
in several chapters). It also tends to focus attention on the criti-
cism of originalism even though Goldford ultimately wants to re-
ject both originalism and "nonoriginalism," and his departure 
from nonoriginalism is left less apparent than it might otherwise 
have been. 
Goldford sees the modern originalism debate as more than 
just an episode in Reagan-era politics. It is rather a manifesta-
tion of our recurring struggle with "the very nature of the 
American constitutional system itself," the commitment to bind-
ing politics and the future with a written Constitution (p. 9). 
Americans are "a people who live textually," but only to the ex-
tent that we allow society to be controlled by the "meaning of its 
fundamental constitutive text" (p. 4). This way of social ordering 
means that "political conflict over principles basic to and defini-
tive of American society quite naturally finds expression in con-
flict over interpretation of the fundamental text that formalizes 
those principles and renders them authoritative" (p. 3). But this 
political dynamic gives rise to the anxiety that the Constitution 
will become the plaything of political opponents, its meaning be-
ing erased and written over by political actors. We might, as Jef-
ferson feared, "make it a blank paper by construction" (p. 9). 
Rather than being the master of politics, the Constitution may 
5. GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1992). 
6. LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LmERALISM (1998). 
7. JOHNATHAN O'NEILL, 0RIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLillCS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2005). 
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become its servant. Originalists may feel this anxiety most 
strongly, and thus they have pressed particularly forcefully on 
the need for a method of constitutional interpretation that will 
limit judicial discretion and maintain constitutional fidelity. 
Goldford is not persuaded by their response to that anxiety, but 
he takes their concern seriously and sees it as lying at the heart 
of the American constitutional project. 
Goldford's dissatisfaction with originalism as an answer to 
what it means to "live textually" is straightforward. It is the 
commitment to constitutional interpretation- the willingness to 
argue in constitutional terms and within the boundaries provided 
by the constitutional text-that creates "textuality," the binding 
of actual American politics by the constitutional text (p. 10). Al-
though textuality requires that "what binds the future is the con-
stitutional text," originalism requires instead that "what binds 
the future is the original understanding of the constitutional 
text" (p. 11). In their hearts, originalists do not trust "the binding 
capacity of language," and so paradoxically fail to "take the 
Constitution seriously" despite their stated desire to do just that 
(p. 12). In their effort to preserve the Constitution, they try to 
substitute something else for it, an "unwritten constitution" 
drawn from the historical record (p. 244). They give up on the 
Constitution itself and subtly abandon the constitutional project 
of binding politics with a written text. 
So what does living textually really mean? Ultimately, 
Goldford argues, the Constitution achieves "social reality" not 
through the dictate of the Court or of the founders but through 
the social activity of the American people (p. 242).8 Originalists, 
according to Goldford, do not believe in "the constitutive char-
acter of the Constitution" and so instead assume that the Consti-
tution has to be imposed on the people by judges (though pre-
sumably, much the same could be said about most normative 
theories of constitutional interpretation) (p. 239). "Textuality" 
operates through three constitutional roles. The Constitution is 
"definitional" in that political debate employs the Constitution's 
terms. It is "conserving" in that its existence "as an actual his-
torical document" pulls that debate back to "that particular set 
of general and specific principles with which the Framers consti-
tuted the American polity." It is "revolutionary" in that current 
8. He endorses to this extent Karl Llewellyn's dictum: "there is only one way of 
knowing whether, and how far, any portion of the Document is still alive; and that is to 
watch what men are doing and how men feel, in the connection." Karl Llewellyn, The 
Constitution as an Institution, 34 COL. L. REV. 1, 15 (1934), quoted in Goldford (p. 249). 
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political practices can be measured against those principles and 
found wanting (p. 236). Goldford gives little attention to these 
roles, however. Instead he emphasizes that what the founders 
gave us is a "social text-the social practice of an ongoing consti-
tutional convention" (p. 275). The Constitution can only be si-
multaneously democratic and binding if we view it as a constitu-
tive document (that makes and is made by current social 
practice) rather than as a positive document (that imposes an 
order on social practice). Constitutional interpretation in this 
constitutive mode gives up the idea that there are right answers 
to constitutional questions or that constitutional interpretation 
can be outside of politics. Living in the text only means engaging 
in legitimate constitutional arguments, making use of the avail-
able constitutional grammar. Constitutional interpretation is 
necessarily political, but it is a politics that must embrace "the 
legitimacy of multiple argumentative positions" and refuse to ac-
cept "the idea of a privileged standpoint" from which to access 
constitutional meaning (pp. 292, 293). Constitutionalism is all 
about argument, about "difference and disagreement," but it is 
apparently never about outcome (p. 202). 
Goldford believes that this constitutional textuality would 
transcend originalism and nonoriginalism. Both originalists and 
nonoriginalists are equally guilty of trying to find "the right 
normative standard governing interpretation," whether they are 
trying to impose "the Framers' position" or "evolving moral 
standards, John Rawls' theory of justice, and so on" on the text 
(p. 194). Rather than trying to lock the language of the Constitu-
tion down, constitutional textuality calls on us simply to "partici-
pate as active subjects in the activity of constitutional meaning," 
to treat the "Constitution" as "a gerund rather than a noun" (p. 
198). In doing so, we would necessarily be interpreting the Con-
stitution that the founders left us, and all we can ever say about 
that text is "this is our best reading of the Constitution." This is, 
by now, a familiar move, pioneered, among others, by David 
Couzens Hoy and Stanley Fish.10 Goldford presses the point in a 
particularly clear and strong fashion, however, and his final 
chapters elaborate a sensibility about constitutionalism that is 
both widespread in contemporary theory and in many ways quite 
attractive.1 
9. David Couzens Hoy, A Hermeneutical Critique of the Originalism!Nonoriginalism 
Distinction, 15 N. KENTUCKY L. REV. 479 (1988). 
10. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989). 
11. This focus on constitutional grammar rather than on constitutional require-
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II. THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY 
Constitutional textuality is an attractive way to understand 
constitutionalism. In an important sense, the Constitution is con-
stitutive in the manner that Goldford highlights. If we are to ex-
perience the Constitution as something other than an alien im-
position, and as a consequence if it is to have authority within 
our politics, then we must recognize ourselves and our ideals in 
that text and feel comfortable continuing to speak in its lan-
guage. A "Constitution" that cannot be reconciled with our po-
litical reality is not a constitution at all; it is, at most, a fac;ade. 
Perhaps, Jon Elster's metaphor should be reversed: The Consti-
tution is not the lash that binds us to the mast, it is the siren's call 
that draws us in to itself (though hopefully not to our doom). 12 
The emphasis of the book on the theoretical significance of 
the "interpretive turn" is also reasonable. There is a range of ar-
gumentative modes available within our accepted, legitimate 
constitutional discourse. Any time we commit ourselves to inter-
preting the text of the Constitution, we have, to that extent, 
committed ourselves to the founders' Constitution. There is no 
authority to which we can appeal to settle our theoretical and in-
terpretive debates; "all we have is the open sea of constitutional 
discourse," and "all we have is our own persuasive powers" (p. 
201). 
The question is how far this pure constitutive approach to 
the Constitution can take us. Goldford would have us not only 
embrace the constitutive notion of the Constitution but also ab-
jure the positivist notion of the Constitution. Undoubtedly, he 
would say that we have no choice-the constitutive is all we 
really have. That perspective, however, leaves us few resources 
with which to understand some fairly basic features of American 
constitutionalism. In particular, it leaves us with two unexplained 
problems of authority. 
rnents is central, for example, to PHILIP BOBBITf, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: niEORY OF 
THE CONSTITUTION (1982); WILLIAM F. HARRis II, niE INTERPRETABLE CONSTITUTION 
(1993); HOWARD SCHWEBER, ni£ LANGUAGE OF LffiERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (forth-
corning). A kind of appeal to textualisrn can (almost) unite those across the interpretation 
debate. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997); RONALD 
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); Jack M. Balkin, Alive and Kicking: Why No One Be-
lieves in a Dead Constitution, SLATE, August 29, 2005 (www.slate.com/id/2125226). 
12. Cf ]ON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS (1984). 
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A. WHY THIS TEXT? 
The American Constitution and the Debate over Originalism 
contends that constitutionalism should be understood simply as a 
text-based social practice. It is the Constitution that "defines 
who we are as a people not just in a symbolic sense, but, more 
significantly, in a substantive sense" (p. 3). It is the "common 
bond of American society" (p. 3). It is this text that we are com-
mitted to interpreting, and the legitimate moves of constitutional 
discourse depend on our ability to make reference to the lan-
guage of the Constitution. As we are repeatedly told, it is "the 
Constitution itself" that is authoritative (p. 78). 
We are not told why this text is authoritative. For the pur-
poses of "textuality," any text will do, as long as we organize 
ourselves around it. It could be the Holy Bible, old Star Trek 
episodes, or "the Constitution" as written by two law profes-
sors.13 Why then is the Constitution in particular authoritative 
for this community, and why is only the Constitution authorita-
tive in this way? Why not the Gettysburg Address, the "I Have a 
Dream" speech, or A Theory of Justice, in addition to or instead 
of the Constitution? Why is the Constitution as a whole, as a uni-
fied document bounded by its preamble and its last amendment, 
the relevant authoritative text? Why might we not select out fa-
vored bits and pieces of the document to give this authoritative 
status while ignoring the rest? Why is the language of the foun-
ders binding on us, especially when we think that their intentions 
in employing that language are not and especially if we think 
that language is not only "definitional" but also communicative 
of a "particular set of general and specific principles" (p. 236)? 
An answer might be purely empirical. It may just happen 
that the Constitution is our textual center. Those who would 
analyze constitutions as coordination devices could accept this 
answer. The Constitution's role is just a historical accident, the 
text of 1787 just happens to be a particularly prominent focal 
point around which we have coordinated our political activities 
and now it would be costly to coordinate around something 
else. 14 Of course, it would still be an empirical question as to 
whether the Constitution actually serves that function, whether 
in fact we take our cues as to who the legitimate next president is 
13. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A 
Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 465 (2000). 
14. John Finnis, Law as Co-ordiTU.Uion, 2 RATIO JURIS 97 (1989); RUSSELL HARDIN, 
LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 82-140 (1999). 
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based on the procedures laid out in Article II and the Twelfth 
Amendment as opposed to, say, the consensus forecast of the 
broadcast newscasters. It seems unlikely that Goldford would be 
content with such an answer, however. He seems to want some-
thing less contingent and more normative. He recognizes that 
the Constitution is authoritative, not merely convenient. 
An alternative answer might be purely historicist. It is 
enough to know that the present community has invested the 
Constitution with this sort of authoritative meaning. The text to 
which this community now consents to be governed could have 
come from anywhere. It could have been found in a bottle on a 
beach, inscribed on a tablet on a mountaintop, or left by a for-
eign prince. What would be important is not why the Constitu-
tion has such a status, but merely that it does now have such a 
status. Its authoritativeness is a pretheorized given that has no 
justification, a foundation on which the theory of textuality can 
be built. This is not an uncommon position for similar sorts of 
antifoundationalist theories, but it is a fairly precarious one to be 
in. 15 If pressed to explain why we are a people defined by the 
Constitution, however, Goldford's account offers little by way of 
a response. We simply are the knights who say "Ni," the keepers 
of the sacred words. 16 
Even if we are willing to accept that, we are still faced with 
the empirical question of whether the Constitution, the whole 
Constitution, and nothing but the Constitution in fact serves this 
political ordering role. To know which, if any, texts serve this 
constitutive role for American society is fundamentally a socio-
logical question, and there is no reason to assume a priori that 
the Constitution is the sole, or even primary, text that performs 
that function. 17 Tracing out the strategies of legitimation within 
contemporary political discourse would likely give only a small 
role to the Constitution. 
There is a better answer as to why we take the Constitution 
as a particularly authoritative text, but the answer requires step-
ping out of the contemporary constitutive framework within 
15. See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, 0BJECfiVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH 175-96 
(1990). 
16. MONTY PYTHON, MONTY PYTHON AND THE HOLY GRAIL (Columbia, 1975). 
17. Cf MARK TuSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY (1999) (elevat-
ing in his "populist constitutional law" the "thin" constitution of the ideals associated 
with the Declaration of Independence over the "thick" constitution of structures and 
rules ~ssociate.d with the Cons~itution itself); ANNE NORTON, REPUBLIC OF SIGNS (1993) 
(argumg that m the ConstitUtiOn "Arnencans become a people of the text" but finding 
equally relevant a wide variety of sources in popular culture). 
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which Goldford has confined himself. 18 The Constitution as a 
unique, coherent text has special authority within our political 
system because of the historical, positive act of its being ratified 
by popular convention. This text is constitutive because of the 
political authority of those who adopted it and, in so doing, 
(re)founded the United States. To be sure, that project of consti-
tutional founding might have failed. The Constitution of 1787 
might have been rejected, replaced, or at some point abandoned. 
That act of founding has continuing force only because of the ac-
tions of subsequent generations in accepting the founders' text 
as their own. Nonetheless, the foundation of constitutional au-
thority is positivist. 19 
To the extent that we remain tethered to the "actual histori-
cal document" and it is this that we must interpret, as Goldford 
says that we must, then it cannot really be true that we are in the 
position of an "ongoing constitutional convention," as he also 
claims (pp. 236, 275). Either the founders and their text have a 
privileged position within our political discourse, or they do not. 
If we are committed to interpreting their text (controlling for 
amendments), then they have an authority as legislators that we 
as interpreters do not have. We are called back to their text and 
their principles as embodied in that text, and we are obliged to 
take those as particularly authoritative (for certain purposes) 
over alternative or conflicting texts or principles that we might 
otherwise prefer and around which we might otherwise order 
our social and political activities. To account for this, we need to 
step out of the framework of free-form constitutive discourse 
and reco15nize that the Constitution is regulative as well as con-
stitutive. The Constitution is "an object" as well as a "social 
practice," a noun as well as a gerund (cf. p. 198). 
18. It is, of course, possible to reject the premise that the Constitution is uniquely 
authoritative. We might argue instead, for example, that the opinions of the Supreme 
Court or the consistent practice of government officials are equally or more authoritative 
within our politics. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 63 U. au. L. REv. 877 (1996); Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary 
Constitution, 147 U. PENN. L. REv. 1 (1998). But that would be to reject Goldford's con-
stitutional textuality. 
19. See also, Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities 
and the Authority of Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION (Andrei Marmor ed., 
1995); Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW (Robert P. 
George ed., 1996). 
20. See also, Keith E. Whittington, Once More Unto the Breach: Postbehavioralist 
Approaches to Judicial Politics, 25 LAW & Soc. INQ. 601,630 (2000). 
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B. WHAT AUTHORIZES JUDGES TO ARBITRATE AMONG 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS? 
375 
The second problem of authority left unaddressed in The 
American Constitution and the Debate over Originalism is that of 
judges exercising the power of judicial review. It is a virtue, not a 
vice, of the book that it revolves around constitutionalism, not 
around judicial review. Most constitutional theory is driven by a 
concern with judicial review and judge-made constitutional law, 
and there is more to constitutionalism than just that. Nonethe-
less, it is a flaw in the book not to recognize that a great deal of 
the originalism debate is driven by a particular concern with the 
work of judges and how best to justify and guide their decisions 
to lay aside the public policies endorsed by elected representa-
tives. The originalism debate speaks to the nature of constitu-
tional interpretation generally, but it is particularly motivated by 
and concerned with constitutional interpretation within a very 
specific institutional context. For both originalists and their crit-
ics, competing understandings about constitutional authority un-
derwrite the institutional authority of the judiciary to speak for 
the text and the particular approaches to constitutional interpre-
tation that the courts might employ.21 From the perspective of 
that debate, any effort to transcend the division between 
originalists and nonoriginalists will have to be evaluated by how 
well it responds to the concerns that opened and sustain that di-
vide. How well does textuality address the problem of judicial 
review? 
On the authority of judges to stamp the Constitution with 
their particular interpretations of its meaning, Goldford is 
largely silent. This is a conscious decision. He notes in his intro-
duction that he thinks the originalism debate has been "errone-
ously conflated with the ... debate over judicial activism and ju-
dicial restraint" (p. 4). The question of "who in the American 
political system is authorized to determine that X is contrary to 
the Constitution" is entirely separate from the question of 
"how-that is, by what criteria-does the authorized inter-
preter(s) determine that X is indeed contrary to the Constitu-
tion" (p. 5). Goldford offers no real argument for regarding 
these questions as completeli' separable, but there is certainly a 
superficial plausibility to it.2 Knowing whether or not original-
21. See also Robert Post, Theories of Constitution Interpretation, in LAW AND THE 
ORDER OF CULTURE (Robert Posted., 1991). 
22. Goldford borrows the questions and their separation from Walter Murphy and 
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ism should guide our interpretations of the Constitution would 
not by itself tell us whether or not we should have judicial review 
or how deferential the judiciary should be when exercising the 
power of constitutional review. An originalist Court might be ac-
tive or passive, deferential or not.23 Nonetheless, there might be 
real connections between the "who" and the "how." We might 
well think that differently situated actors might approach the 
Constitution differently. Certainly we might think twice before 
authorizing the Court to employ an approach to constitutional 
interpretation that would explicitly transform the justices into an 
"ongoing constitutional convention" (p. 275). 
It has been decades since such talk of ongoing constitutional 
conventions has commonly been used without either irony or de-
rision. There is a reason why Goldford can engage in such talk 
without apparent self-consciousness, and that is again because he 
minimizes the regulative quality of the Constitution. When he 
speaks of the first "fundamental" premise of American constitu-
tionalism, that its purpose is "to bind future generations to the 
vision of its founders," he understands that to mean something 
very limited (p. 10).24 What the founders gave us is merely "ar-
gumentation and debate" (p. 275). In contrast to originalism, the 
very exemplar of "a regulative theory of constitutional interpre-
tation," Goldford's constitutional textuality is a purely constitu-
tive theory (p. 11). It does not seek to bind the unwilling. There 
is no apparent question of these understandings of constitutional 
requirements being imposed on those who are dubious of them. 
It does not need to grapple with the countermajoritarian diffi-
culty. Quoting Hanna Pitkin, the "Constitution" in this constitu-
tive sense is just "something we are" (p. 240).25 As a presump-
tively constitutive text, the Constitution in this sense is almost 
necessarily both "democratic" (it is what we are) and "binding" 
(how could we be anything other than what we are?). We know 
the Constitution by its works. 
his co-authors (p. 5, n.13). WALTER F. MURPHY, JAMES E. FLEMING, & WILLIAM F. 
HARRIS III, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1986). See also, Walter F. 
Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 
REV. POL. 401 (1986). 
23. See also, Whittington, supra note 4. 
24. It is worth noting that Goldford gives more normative weight to intergenera-
tional constitutional binding than seems proper. The intergenerational survival of a piece 
of constitutional text is purely contingent within American constitutionalism. In the first 
instance, the goal of a constitutional constraint is not to bind our descendants but to bind 
our government officials. 
25. Quoting Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL ED. 
167, 167 (1987). 
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How far can this constitutive approach carry us in under-
standing American constitutionalism? Part of the way, but not 
all of the way, I believe. Perhaps more accurately, it can take us 
a long way in understanding the nature of constitutionalism as 
such but not very far in understanding a particular instantiation 
of it, in this case in the form of the U.S. Constitution. In its par-
ticulars, the Constitution attempts to do more than order the po-
litical system and establish a grammar of political debate. It also 
attempts to settle some actual or potential controversies, to es-
tablish right answers to some constitutional questions. It makes 
some substantive commitments. In some cases, those commit-
ments may be fairly specific, leaving little room for debate. In 
other cases, those commitments may be less specific, leaving 
more room for debate about how best to construe and apply 
them. In either case, the Constitution seeks to regulate govern-
ment action by ruling some options out of bounds, and it calls on 
faithful constitutional interpreters to recognize those boundaries 
and enforce them against those who are less meticulous or less 
faithful. Daniel Webster represents one clear vein in the Ameri-
can constitutional tradition when scolding that a constitution 
that did not establish limits that are either clear in themselves or 
subject to authoritative resolution "should not be denominated a 
constitution. It should be called, rather, a collection of topics, for 
everlasting controversy; heads of debate for a disputatious peo-
ple. It would not be a government. It would not be adequate to 
any practical good, nor fit for any country to live under. "26 
Within the discourse of American constitutionalism, there is a 
consistent and appropriate demand for a method of constitu-
tional interpretation that promises to get the Constitution right. 
Both originalist and nonoriginalist theories of constitutional in-
terpretation seek to respond to that demand. Goldford's theory 
of constitutional textuality does not. 
Constitutional textuality may serve more adequately as an 
external account of American constitutional discourse than as an 
internal account that can be consciously deployed by the partici-
pants in that discourse. As an outside observer, we may well rec-
ognize that all interpretations are contingent, that it is discourse 
"all the way down," that there are multiple modes of legitimate 
constitutional argumentation, and that looking across history the 
most notable constant is that there will be argument and debate. 
As an inside participant in the process of constitutional interpre-
26. 6 REG. DEB. 78 (1830). 
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tation, however, we may nonetheless be obliged to struggle as 
best we can to identify what we take to be the right answers. 
Goldford hints as much when he notes that "The written nature 
of the American Constitution has contributed to the develop-
ment of a legalistic, and thus more narrow, notion of constitu-
tionalism centered on courts, but constitutional theory is an in-
tellectual domain whose concern with general issues in 
constitutionalism identifies it as more a species of social and po-
litical theory than of conventional constitutional law" (p. 240). 
He offers constitutional textuality as a "descriptive and analyti-
cal argument about the nature of constitutional interpretation," 
as part of the effort "to put constitutions back into the empirical 
concerns of political science and social theory," rather than as 
"some alternative normative theory" (pp. 18, 19). This form of 
constitutional theory, as "grand theory" or "meta-theory," can 
be valuable.27 But it can go astray when it steps out of the ana-
lytical mode and questions whether "we need a normative the-
ory in the first place" (p. 18).Z8 When doing that it ceases to be 
an academic alternative to participating in the originalism debate 
and instead becomes an alternative within the originalism de-
bate. But as an alternative within that debate-as a suggestion to 
those who would do constitutional interpretation-constitutional 
textuality provides little normative leverage for substantively or 
procedurally resolving constitutional controversies. 
III. INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 
But what should an originalist take away from the critiques 
of originalism in The American Constitution and the Debate over 
Originalism? I will not attempt to respond to those critiques in 
detail.29 I do, however, think that originalists should take Gold-
27. See also, Keith E. Whittington, Herbert Wechsler's Complaint and the Revival of 
Grand Constitutional Theory, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 509 (2000). 
28. In doing so, it gives in to what Stanley Fish has called "theory hope," a false 
expectation that the conclusions of metatheory ought to have consequences for theory. 
FISH, supra note 10, at 324, 342. The fact that we know that individual interpreters oper-
ate within interpretive communities that help define what considerations are counted as 
persuasive within them does not help us determine how any given interpretive commu-
nity should function. 
29. I have presented an extended argument for a version of originalism in KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL 
INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999). Goldford devotes a chapter to that argument 
(pp. 208-34). Here, as elsewhere, the central thrust of Goldford's critique is that either 
originalism is impossible (we cannot control our interpretation of one t~xt by reference 
to other texts) or unavoidable (if we are interpreting, then we must be mterpretmg the 
author's text). AJ; I argue in the book, I believe that while we may always be interpreting 
2005] BOOK REVIEWS 379 
ford's central points seriously. His emphasis on the semantic 
autonomy of the text is widely shared and weighty. His insis-
tence that we recognize the constitutive character of the Consti-
tution is well taken. The book helps direct us to where the real 
theoretical disagreements between originalists and their critics 
still are.30 The originalist arguments of the 1980s were motivated 
by the desire to restrain judges and were often framed in terms 
of interpretation versus noninterpretation, but as eventually be-
came clear most scholars were willing to claim the label of "in-
terpretation" and the subjective experience of "constraint" was 
hardly the issue. 
As the questions raised in Part II above suggest, the central 
issues may well relate to the problem of political authority. Re-
cent theorizing about originalism (which should probably be dis-
tinguished from political agitation about originalism) has been 
motivated less by concerns about judicial discretion than about 
what the sources of constitutional authority are taken to be and 
what is required for constitutional fidelity given those under-
standings. Less evident but related, I think, is disagreement 
about what the purpose of judicially enforceable constitutional 
rules are. Arguably, originalists tend to think the purpose of such 
rules is to prevent political powerholders (whether understood 
as electoral majorities or particular government officials) from 
exercising that power in ways that are not constitutionally au-
thorized, whereas their critics tend to think the purpose of such 
rules is to prevent wrongful or unjust action simply. 
Here again I think we need to reintroduce the institutional 
complexity of our constitutional system, a complexity that Gold-
ford largely ignores. In setting aside the issue of judicial review 
and the "narrow" constitutionalism of the courts, Goldford 
the author's text, we will do a better job of it if we are clear about who the relevant "au-
thor" is. Or, as Larry Alexander has observed, it may be "redundant to speak of that 
Fred's original determinations," but it does matter who "Fred" is. Larry Alexander, 
Originalism, or Who Is Fred?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 321, 325 (1996). Goldford 
observes that "originalism and theories of indeterminacy are locked in an embrace with 
each other, bound in their shared premise of the importance of authorial intent" to con-
fining the possibilities of textual meaning (p. 219). Of course, in practice we do not ex-
perience texts as indeterminate in this way, except when subjected to deconstructionist 
analysis. But from the fact that we naturally settle on some determinate understanding of 
the text, it does not follow that we will settle on the correct understanding unless we are 
guided by the appropriate considerations when interpreting. Originalism and 
nonoriginalism disagree about what those appropriate considerations are. Goldford's 
textuality suggests that any consideration is appropriate. 
30. In applying originalism in any given case, there may well remain real practical 
questions as to how far available historical materials might take one in resolving the con-
tested meaning of a given text. 
380 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY (Vol. 22:365 
speaks instead of an undifferentiated "we as a polity" who inter-
pret and are bound by the Constitution (pp. 240, 285). When he 
says that "we" simultaneously consent to and are bound by the 
Constitution in the process of textuality, it is this undifferenti-
ated we that is in play (pp. 10-13). In describing how the Consti-
tution operates as a constitutive rather than a regulative rule, he 
emphasizes that nothing political exists in a form that "predates" 
the Constitution, nothing stands outside of it for it to regulate (p. 
268). Instead, like a bishop in a chess game, all the "institutions, 
relations, and procedures" of both the government and "the 
people" are "constituted by and are 'logically dependent on' the 
Constitution" (p. 269). Unlike a chess piece, however, political 
actors are autonomous agents with real power at their disposal. 
The president's authority may be "logically dependent on" the 
Constitution (though even this is too formalistic, as political 
leaders including the president draw authority from a variety of 
sources including "electoral mandates," popular approval and 
personal charisma), but his power is not. We wish to deploy the 
Constitution not merely to bind "us" or "future generations," 
but most importantly to bind current government officials who 
might exercise their power in ways that are at odds with our own 
sense of the constitutional requirements. To focus on the consti-
tutive to the exclusion of the regulative can miss the ways in 
which we not only enact the Constitution through our actions 
but also struggle over it. 
Although originalists might well insist that the proper goal 
of those interpreting the Constitution is to realize the meaning 
that was imbued in that text by the founders, they should also 
recognize that such interpretive efforts will not exhaust what can 
be done with the text. Originalists qua originalists are only con-
cerned with the bare minimum of how we must live if we are to 
adhere to the requirements of the Constitution. That bare mini-
mum may be easy or hard to satisfy, but it is what the Constitu-
tion was written to demand of government officials. It may or 
may not be easy to determine what those requirements are, or 
what their implications are for the case at hand, but the standard 
for evaluating proffered interpretations of them is whether they 
realize the requirements established by those with the authority 
to dictate the fundamental law. For the Court, the appeal to the 
original meaning of the Constitution provides a ready basis for 
its own authority to review and set aside the policies of other 
government officials. Originalism offers a refuge for judges from 
having to make a direct appeal to controversial value judgments, 
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challenging other officials to either submit to the judicial inter-
pretation, to offer their own better interpretation of the original 
Constitution, or to explain why the principles embedded in the 
constitutional text should be abandoned. 
There might well be additional constitutional moves that we 
can make. We appeal to the Constitution to help us identify how 
we should live as well as how we must live. In doing so, we con-
struct a Constitution of our own. Such constitutional construc-
tions may take inspiration from the text but they need not make 
claims that they are the only plausible interpretation of it. Such 
constructions are not authoritative. Those who offer them can-
not draw upon the larger authority of the founders and ask for 
deference in their name. The construction of the text does rest 
on its own persuasiveness as to what the Constitution might be. 
Unsurprisingly, those who would reconstruct our under-
standing of the Constitution do not simply rely on the persua-
siveness of their proffered understandings. They seek to stack 
the deck in their favor. They alloy their constitutional arguments 
with other appeals, and significantly they exploit the tools of po-
litical power to construct their preferred constitutional order. In 
actual practice of American constitutionalism, the word is bound 
to the polity not just through reasoned discourse but also 
through political force, including that of judges exercising the 
constructed and inherited power of judicial review.31 
The debate over originalism is about one particular feature 
of American constitutionalism. Originalists and their critics at-
tempt to provide an account of how the Constitution might op-
erate as a legal rule such that it can be used within and justify the 
practice of judicial review. To the extent that the Constitution 
provides right answers to political questions, originalists and 
their critics offer accounts of how best to determine those right 
answers. That debate is not the sum total of constitutional schol-
arship. Goldford succeeds less in transcending the originalism 
debate than in changing the subject. He does not offer a compel-
ling alternative way to justify the practice of judicial review or 
guide those who would seek to interpret and apply the Constitu-
tion, though he does help sharpen our understanding of how the 
contending sides in the current debate differ. He is more success-
ful in pointing us toward different questions that we might ask, 
31. On the practice of constitutional construction, see KEITII E. WHIITINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 
(1999). 
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some of which are empirical (How is the constitutional text in 
fact deployed to legitimate political action? How significant is 
the Constitution as a source of political legitimacy in contempo-
rary politics? How do we come to have the constitutional under-
standings and practice that we in fact have?) and some of which 
are conceptual (How can we understand the notion of a constitu-
tional people that transcends multiple generations? What are the 
basic purposes of a constitution within a political system?). For 
those interested in changing the subject from the debates over 
judicial review, there are plenty of other features of American 
constitutionalism worth exploring. 
